Funding Urban Infrastructure: Value Creation, Property Tax and Other Revenues - Dominique Bureau
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Conseil économique pour le développement durable Funding Urban Infrastructure: Value Creation, Property Tax and Other Revenues Dominique Bureau Conseil économique pour le développement durable www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr
Complex funding model • Le périmètre des dépenses du Nouveau Grand Paris d’ici 2030 est de 25,525 milliards d’euros. • Pour financer ces dépenses, la Société du Grand Paris dispose de recettes fiscales affectées déjà • Dans un deuxième temps, la SGP aura mises en place, qui sont de trois natures : recours à l’emprunt, qu’elle remboursera – une fraction de la taxe locale sur les bureaux en Île-de-France qui est assise sur grâce à trois types d’apports: les surfaces à usage de bureaux, de locaux – les recettes fiscales affectées; commerciaux, de locaux de stockage, de stationnement ; – les redevances d’usage payées par – la taxe spéciale d’équipement, taxe les exploitants (péages) à compter additionnelle aux taxes locales ; – une composante de l’Imposition des mises en services; Forfaitaire sur les Entreprises de – les recettes complémentaires tirées Réseaux (IFER) assise sur le matériel roulant exploité par la RATP. Ainsi, la SGP notamment de l’exploitation perçoit plus de 500 millions d’euros de commerciale des gares (publicité, recettes fiscales affectées par an. commerce, etc.) ou d’autres • L’État apportera un soutien budgétaire à la Société du Grand Paris à hauteur de 1 milliard services. d’euros. De même, l’État demande que les collectivités locales apportent 225 millions d’euros. • Enfin, des recettes fiscales affectées supplémentaires pourront être mises en place à compter de 2020, en accompagnement des améliorations de desserte procurées par les premières mises en service.
A common problem • The Crossrail 1 project funding structure includes a substantial contribution from two local sources: – the Business Rates Supplement (BRS) was established in London specifically to fund Crossrail 1 and is generating a steady flow of income that is being used to repay debt raised to finance the project’s construction. – the Mayoral Community Infrastructure Levy (Mayoral CIL) is a charge on all new development in London. Its purpose is to contribute to the cost of additional infrastructure required as a consequence of new homes, offices and other buildings. • In summary, the views of those consulted were that: – the levy elements of the funding package (BRS and Mayoral CIL) had worked well (in that the loans taken out for Crossrail 1 are forecast be repaid on time or even early); – the amounts raised by negotiating contributions from landowners on the route have generated only a small proportion of the value of the scheme; – and many land and property owners who have benefited most from the project are not making a commensurate contribution to the project costs.”
The standard economic recommandation • HGT: the value created by • In practice: special tools (TIF, LOCAL public equipments JPD), rather than general capitalizes into land rents development of property taxes • Additional rents should be • And controversies about: taxed for financing the – Distortionary impacts of associated fixed costs property taxes (« capital • (By the means of property taxes view ») the local Authority recovers the – The degree of capitalization rent she has created)
A strong, controversial, tendancy… …need to clarify regulatory models (one till vs double-till) But, before that, the objectives: additional revenues or enlarged quality range of services for consumers?
Purpose of the study • Two questions: – Management rules for additional services provided by local public equipments: 1st Best (LLH) Pricing or Ramsey-Boiteux markups? – Assignment of potential funding instruments between property taxes, other local taxes (poll, housing), revenues from shops and services? • Main characteristics of the model: a standard urban monocentric model… – which does not assume perfect population mobility between cities (possible incomplete land rent capitalization of the benefits of the projects) – with property tax base including the value of buildings (hence acting as taxes on construction)
Notations • Willingness-to-pay for the services provided by the equipment • Social value for a resident • Surplus of a resident • Costs of the equipment
Urban costs
Competitive equilibrium of land markets
Optimal policy with two fiscal instruments: α, τ
A urban platform Local public Equipment (d) (z,Y) N α τ Social Value (k) Landowners Developers Residents
Urban externalities
Summary of results Structure of local taxes Markups above Role of property taxes (appropriate) MSC Benchmark: perfect mobility; no distorsion +++ 0 Imperfect capitalization 0 Construction choices incentives 0 Agglomeration externalities 0 Architectural externalities 0 Weight of low-mobile residents 0 Heterogeneous WTP - or ? Cost incentives - 0 Fixed costs selection, high mobility Fixed costs selection, low mobility -
From average cost pricing to TIF, JPD…
Conclusion • The benchmark for pricing additional activities offered residents by public equipments should remain marginal cost even with distorsions and imperfect mobility of residents. Local taxes remain the most natural tools for funding fixed costs, the development of new revenues from retail activities firstly being to be conceived as an element of a strategy for global value creation. • Structure of local taxes – Fiscal distorsions. Ramsey-Boiteux features combined with externalities internalization prevail, – Selection of socially justified equipments. The transposition of the “average pricing rule” in this context is to earmark or capture property value induced by the project to fund it: the conditionality that supplementary land rents need to be greater than development costs lead to the efficient levels for all public and additional services provided by the equipment. In this perspective tools to test and implement this condition must be developed. • Extensions: competitive issues; cooperation between networks
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