China: A Satiated Power? A Rising Hegemon in International Perspective
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China: A Satiated Power?
A Rising Hegemon in International
Perspective
Prepared by Sean Clark
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CHINA: A SATIATED POWER?
A RISING HEGEMON IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Sean Clark, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia
Prepared for the International Security Research and Outreach Programme
International Security and Intelligence Bureau
1
PREFACE
The International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) is located
within the Defence and Security Relations Division of The International Security and
Intelligence Bureau. ISROP’s mandate is to provide the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) with timely, high quality policy
relevant research that will inform and support the development of Canada’s
international security policy in the areas of North American, regional and
multilateral security and defence cooperation, non-proliferation, arms control and
disarmament. The current ISROP research themes can be found at:
http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/index
ISROP regularly commissions research to support the development of Canadian
foreign policy by drawing on think-tank and academic networks in Canada and
abroad. The following report, China: A Satiated Power? A Rising Hegemon in
International Perspective, is an example of such contract research.
Disclaimer: The views and positions expressed in this report are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade or the Government of Canada. The report is in its original
language.
2
PRÉAMBULE
Le Programme de recherche et d’information dans le domaine de la sécurité
internationale (PRISI) fait partie de la Direction des relations de sécurité et de
défense, qui relève elle-même de la Direction générale de la sécurité internationale.
Ce programme a pour mandat de fournir au Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du
Commerce international (MAÉCI), en temps utile, des études stratégiques
pertinentes et de haute qualité qui permettent d’orienter et de soutenir l’élaboration
de la politique canadienne en matière de sécurité internationale concernant la
coopération nord-américaine, régionale et multilatérale en matière de sécurité et de
défense, ainsi que la non-prolifération, le contrôle des armements et le
désarmement. Les thèmes de recherches actuels du PRISI figurent à l’adresse
suivante :
http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/index
Le PRISI commande régulièrement des études à des groupes de réflexion et à des
réseaux d’universitaires au Canada et à l’étranger afin d’appuyer l’élaboration de la
politique étrangère canadienne. Le rapport sommaire suivant, intitulé, La Chine :
Une puissance rassasiée? Le nouvel hégémonisme chinois dans une
perspective internationale, est un exemple de ce type d’étude.
Déni de responsabilité : Les vues et opinions exprimées dans le présent rapport
sont exclusivement celles de l’auteur, et ne reflètent pas nécessairement la position
du Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international, ou celle du
gouvernement du Canada. Le rapport est présenté dans la langue de rédaction.
3
Executive Summary
For all the fear and concern accompanying discussions of China’s spectacular
reemergence, the central conclusion of this paper is that current behaviours and
contemporary trends point to a future where China maintains its current satisfaction with
the international system. In terms of security, China’s neighbours are too weak
individually to pose much of a threat, yet at the same time powerful enough in tandem to
make military expansionism impractical. This is not to suggest that China lacks those who
yearn for the return of lost territory, such as ‘rebel’ Taiwan or the ‘nine-dash line’ in the
South China Sea, but that there is very little reason to think these revanchists have the
strength to carry the day. This is in large part due to the central pillar of the CCP’s rule: the
achievement of steady economic growth. For all its flaws, the CCP has overseen the most
impressive economic catch-up of all time. The conclusion amongst the Chinese public is
that continued communist rule is thus a laurel worth bestowing.
The remaining key aspect of great power satiation is wealth. Here again there is
nothing to suggest that China will find the international system discomfiting. Chinese
exporters have gone from strength to strength, with little opposition from overseas
markets shown. Rather than slapping on anti-dumping duties and erecting tariff walls,
foreigners have lined up to buy cheap Chinese goods. Moreover, what little tension does
exist can be expected to diminish as China’s economy continues its trend of shifting away
from exports and more towards domestic consumption. The consequent forecast is for
smaller current account surpluses and thus even less international wrangling over Chinese
market gains.
In short, the future of economic growth in China will lie primarily on the strength
and vigour of the domestic reforms that must now be undertaken. Even here there is good
reason for optimism, given that a clutch of economic reformers has been installed at the
very heights of the Chinese economy. If the success of these able technocrats in the late
1990s is any indication, markets will be further freed and the concomitant productivity
gains made plentiful. Such a result would set the stage for a China quite unlike the
Germany of 1914, a power deeply unsatisfied with the contemporary international system
and surrounded by mutual hostility. Instead, China would appear much more similar to the
United States of 1890, steadily—and contentedly—gaining in power and influence but to
the anger and detriment of few.
4
Sommaire
Malgré toutes les craintes et les préoccupations exprimées dans les discussions sur
la renaissance spectaculaire de la Chine, la principale conclusion de ce document est que
tous les comportements actuels et toutes les tendances futures laissent présager un avenir
où la Chine continuera de s’estimer satisfaite du système international. S’agissant de la
sécurité, les voisins de la Chine, pris individuellement, sont trop faibles pour constituer une
quelconque menace. Dans le même temps, ensemble, ils sont suffisamment puissants pour
amener Beijing à renoncer à tout projet d’expansion militaire. Cela ne veut pas dire pour
autant que la Chine ne souhaite pas récupérer le territoire perdu, comme Taïwan la
« rebelle » ou la zone dite de la « ligne en neuf traits », dans la mer de Chine méridionale. Il
semble cependant très peu probable que les revanchards exercent suffisamment de
pouvoirs pour mener à bien leurs projets. Dans une large mesure, cela s’explique par l’un
des objectifs centraux du programme du Parti communiste chinois (PCC) : l’instauration
d’une croissance économique durable. Et c’est sous la direction du PCC, malgré tous ses
défauts, que s’est effectué l’un des rattrapages économiques les plus impressionnants de
tous les temps. En conséquence, pour le public chinois, le maintien du communisme en vaut
le prix.
Le dernier besoin qu’une grande puissance cherche à satisfaire, c’est la richesse. Or,
sur ce point encore, rien ne laisse penser que la Chine trouvera à redire du système
international. Les activités des exportateurs chinois ne cessent de se développer, alors que
le reste du monde se contente de regarder passer les trains. Au lieu d’imposer des droits
antidumping et d’ériger des obstacles tarifaires, les étrangers font la file pour acheter des
marchandises chinoises bon marché. Qui plus est, les tensions restantes, si petites soient-
elles, devraient s’estomper à mesure que l’économie chinoise continuera de se rééquilibrer
au profit de la consommation intérieure, et au détriment des exportations. Aussi faut-il
prévoir des excédents moins importants du solde du compte courant et, par voie de
conséquence, moins de discorde encore sur la scène internationale.
Autrement dit, l’avenir de la croissance économique en Chine sera tributaire, d’abord
et avant tout, de la force et de la vigueur des réformes à engager dès maintenant au niveau
national. Même dans ce domaine, l’heure est à l’optimisme, étant donné que l’on a confié à
une poignée de réformateurs économiques les rênes mêmes de l’économie chinoise. Si l’on
se fie au succès de ces technocrates efficaces, à la fin des années 1990, une libéralisation
accrue des marchés est à prévoir et, dans la foulée, des gains de productivité considérables.
Si tel est le cas, la Chine ressemblera non pas à l’Allemagne de 1914, mais plutôt aux États-
Unis de 1990, de sorte que son pouvoir et son influence augmenteront constamment, sans
susciter la colère, ni au détriment d’autrui.
5
Introduction 1
The most dominant political economy trend of the past two decades has been the
reconvergence of wealth between East and West. After two centuries spent languishing in
deep poverty, China has roared back to the front rank of world economies. Beginning with
the cautious reforms of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, markets have been freed, property rights
promulgated, and profit once again made legal. With the vibrancy of capitalism unleashed,
Chinese productivity has soared and entrepreneurialism flourished. Combined with a
large, disciplined, and low-cost workforce, China has become extremely attractive to
overseas investors. Even more, the country’s high rate of domestic saving and persistent
current account surpluses has led to unprecedented capital accumulation. At over $2
trillion, 2 China has already built up the world’s largest stock of financial reserves.3
Meanwhile, the country continues to build schools, factories, and airports at breakneck
speed. Hundreds of millions of Chinese have been lifted out of poverty during this
transformation from agrarian backwater to ‘workshop of the world.’ From Shanghai to
Shenzen, endless rows of gleaming new skyscrapers have gone up seemingly overnight,
transforming the skylines of cities once trapped in drab Maoism into the cutting edge of
architecture and design. In short, China now boasts the most impressive economic catch-
up of all time.
The reverberations of China’s tremendous economic expansion have been felt in
many fields, but perhaps nowhere are the implications more profound than the matter of
international power. Realists have long contended that economic strength underlays
military capability. 4 This notion finds agreement within Chinese strategic culture, where
the expression “prosperous army and strong country” is commonly espoused. 5 The recent
purchase of new fighters, ships, and missiles, to say nothing of the dramatic improvement
in the People Liberation Army’s (PLA) basic kit and training, has certainly been made
possible by the country’s buoyant economy. Further growth will enable military spending
to become even more lavish. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
suggests that given potential American budget cuts China could conceivably be
outspending the United States on defence by 2022. 6 Some fear this buildup signals a much
more aggressive Chinese international posture. Arthur Waldron suggests that “sooner or
later, if present trends continue without change, war is probable in Asia….China today is
actively seeking to scare the United States away from East Asia.” 7
It is possible that such estimations are overly dramatic. True, the country will, as
rising powers are wont to do, develop new and more sophisticated military capabilities.
But these need not upset China’s ‘Big Switzerland’ policy of conducting their affairs while
1 This section draws from Sean Clark, “In the Dreadnought’s Shadow,” Canadian Naval Review, (Fall 2011).
2 Note that all figures are in nominal USD, unless otherwise stated.
3 Anthony Faiola, “China Worried About U.S. Debt,” Washington Post, March 14, 2009.
4 Jacob Viner, “Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries,” World Politics (1948).
5 Peter Hays Gries, China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2003, p105.
6 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 2013, (London: IISS, 2013).
7 Arthur Waldron, “How Not to Deal With China,” Commentary, (March 1997).
6
“hiding their light under a bushel.” 8 Chinese scholar and Communist Party (CCP) theorist
Zheng Bijian asserts that China will “not follow the path of Germany leading up to World
War I or those of Germany and Japan leading up to World War II.” Instead, it shall
“transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge” and “strive for peace,
development, and cooperation with all countries of the world.” 9 Such a pacific strategy is
eminently plausible, given that “China is stronger today and its borders are more secure
than at any other time in the last 150 years.” 10 There is also good reason for China and the
other great powers to remain on friendly terms. China and the United States, for example,
enjoy close trading ties, a common enthusiasm for basketball and free enterprise, and even
fought alongside one another in the Second World War. Nowhere is it preordained that a
young colossus must come to blows with the powers who preceded it.
Yet what if this assumption of enduring tranquility does not hold true? We need not
travel far to uncover such sentiment. It is certainly discomfiting to the Party leadership
that so much of the economy depends on raw materials obtained from abroad. 11 Never
before has China had to worry about foreign supplies keeping the lights on and the
factories humming. 12 So too does Beijing remember that in the early 1800s China’s role as
regional hegemon was upset in dramatic fashion. During this period China found itself
brutally “thrown out to the margins” of a suddenly Eurocentric world. 13 A “century of
humiliation” ensued, a wrenching memory that still lingers, ever feeding the conviction that
the nation’s ‘middle kingdom’ status must one day be restored. 14 In the mid-1990s Chinese
nationalists marched under the banner of “China Can Say No” 15 and today nationalist
websites seethe with rage at every perceived international slight. Even the former Chinese
Premier, Wen Jiabo, has openly accused the United States as “trying to preserve its status as
the world’s sole superpower, and [denying] any country the chance to pose a challenge to
it.” 16 In fact, most of the Chinese leadership assumes that strategic rivalry with America
will only “increase with the ascension of Chinese power.” 17 Perhaps this is why a country
facing minimal chance of invasion is now the world’s second largest military spender.
8 “The Trillion-Dollar Club,” The Economist, April 17, 2010.
9 Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs (vol. 84, 2005), p22.
10 Andrew J Nathan and Robert S Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security,
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), p226.
11 Y Deng and F Wang, China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, (Lanham: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2005).
12 Jad Mouawad, “China's Growth Shifts the Geopolitics of Oil,” New York Times, March 19, 2010.
13 Chen Zemin, “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China 14,
no. 42 (February 2005), p36-7; Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, (Toronto: Vintage,
2009), p27.
14 Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future, (Santa
Monica: RAND, 2000), p15.
15 Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, (Toronto: Vintage, 2009), p30.
16 Andrew J Nathan and Bruce Gilley, China's New Rulers: the Secret Files, (New York: Review Books, 2003),
p208.
17 Rosalie Chen, “China Perceives America: Perspectives of International Relations Experts,” Journal of
Contemporary China 12, no. 35 (May 2003), p290.
7
Theory & Research Design
This leaves us with a crucial a question: how likely is a growing China to conclude the
current international order is sufficiently accommodating to its national interests? The
model posited here is simple, assuming that great powers are primarily concerned with
security, national grievances, domestic politics, and wealth. If ‘satiation’ can be achieved on
these fronts, a growing power will be sure to keep any revolutionary intentions it harbours
in check. If not, the expectation is for ever-greater levels of animus, belligerence, and the
growing prospect of war.
A fair question is to ask why these variables and not others? Their selection is the
product of the author’s previous research, 18 as well as their service as a rough
encapsulation of the major bodies of international relations thought. Realists, for example,
hold security as a statesman’s ultimate concern. Authors from Machiavelli to Morgenthau
emphasize that in the absence of security, no other political good is obtainable. 19
Successful invaders impose their own legal and moral codes, domestic preferences
notwithstanding. The precondition for international tranquility is therefore a relative
balance of power among rivals. Only with force sufficient to keep all neighbours at bay
does international cooperation become possible.
Liberals are more divided but no less adamant in their claims. Wealth, one school
argues, is the ultimate salve to perceived national slight. Become rich and all sins will be
forgiven. The capacity to generate wealth is therefore the central determinant of
international stability; a growing economy is expected to remain fat and happy. 20 Liberals
of the domestic politics persuasion argue instead that the stability of any regime rests on
its ability to deliver political goods to its main supporting constituencies. Failure to do so
risks political upheaval, with the aggrieved party rising up and casting the ruling class to
the street. International politics is thus a two-level game: 21 dealings at the international
level must not only make the state stronger and wealthier, but also improve the domestic
palatability and hence survival of those in charge.
This paper makes a similar effort to incorporate constructivist and cultural theories.
This is done by evaluating the extent of popular sentiment vis-a-vis the international
system. In some cases, such as France leading up to the Great War, 22 no manner of wealth
or security can quench a burning desire to have some perceived historical slight put right.
This is termed revanchism, from the French word for revenge. Having lost its provinces of
Alsace and Lorraine to Germany in 1871, many in France demanded the territory returned
no matter the cost. In 1873 the French poet Victor Laprade wrote:
18 See the complete collection at www.seanmclark.ca.
19 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey Mansfield, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Hans
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York: Knopf, 1973).
20 Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (London: Harper, 1961); Norman Angell, The
Foundations of International Polity, (William Heinemann, 1914).
21 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games,” International
Organization, (vol. 42, 1988).
22 John F V Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).
8
“Land of pity, sweet land of France; The honour I render, the love I owe; Inspire
nothing more in me than hatred and vengeance: A dream of bloodshed fills my mind
in your glades.” 23
When such views become pervasive the existing international order will be deemed
intolerable by politicians and public alike. Given the demonstrated power of this effect, it
too has been incorporated into the study.
Together these variables provide a useful means of evaluating just how satisfied
China is with the international status quo, and how likely this condition is to continue into
the foreseeable future. Of course, Beijing and its citizens may care about additional
matters, and there is no certainty that unhappiness with any of them will ensure war’s
instigation. But few would argue that a China threatened by regional insecurity, economic
uncertainty, or domestic upheaval would consider the current international arrangement
tenable over the long term. Similarly, no one would suggest that a China riven with
unbridled antipathy towards its neighbours could be trusted to keep its finger off the
trigger. On the other hand, a China that finds relative satisfaction in what the
contemporary order offers each of these needs can be expected to be a relatively
harmonious member of global society.
23 Cited from M J Cohen and John S Major, History in Quotations, (London: Orion, 2008), p703.
9International Security
We are firm in our resolve to uphold China’s sovereignty, security and development
interests and will never yield to any outside pressure.”
Hu Jintao, Report to CPC Congress, November 2012
China lives in a dangerous neighbourhood. It is surrounded on all sides by countries
with whom it has a violent past. Many of these slights have not yet been forgotten;
memories in Asia run deep. It is therefore unsurprising that this well of grievance and
animosity recently passed Europe to become the world’s second-largest military market. 24
Revived economic powers, the thinking seems to be, require armouries befitting their
newfound wealth and status—all the better to settle old scores. Policymakers in Beijing
thus have good reason for casting a nervous eye to what has over the last two decades
become a highly militarized region.
There is certainly no shortage of candidates worthy of China paying close heed.
Taiwan and Japan, for example, boast advanced American-designed fighter planes and the
latest shipborne radar. South Korea, too, is home to a sophisticated army and is a growing
naval power, with four 14,000-ton flattop assault ships soon to be completed. In the west,
India’s military is undergoing a vast modernization program, including the deployment of
new main battle tanks and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. In the north,
Russia deploys along its border plentiful military hardware of a sophistication China
cannot yet match. Most potent of all lies to the east, just offshore. Here the US Navy and its
peerless collections of ships and aircraft patrol as they have done since the closing months
of the Second World War, ever watchful.
24 Andrew T H Tan, The Arms Race in Asia: Trends, Concepts and Implications, (Routledge, 2013).
1011
Growing Power, Enduring Gap
Against this China can nevertheless look to its own burgeoning military strength. 25
Numerically, the country has always been at the front rank of armed forces. Even today the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) boasts 1.6 million soldiers under arms, an air force of
420,000 personnel, and a navy of 270,000 sailors. More important, however, is the rapidly
improving quality of these forces. Much of this is due to China’s generous defence budget,
which although staying relatively steady in terms of GDP share, has grown rapidly in
absolute value thanks to the country’s torrid economic growth. Much of this spending is
cloaked in secrecy and buried within other departments; the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the IISS conclude the official defence budget
underestimates actual spending by some 30-50%. Yet despite this imprecision the overall
trend is consistent: China spends vastly more on its military than just a few years ago A
good guess today is a defence budget of about $140 billion US per year, or 2% of GDP and
roughly triple the amount spent in the mid-1990s. 26
Growing budgets have enabled the purchase of a vastly improved arsenal. From
Russia have come S-300 missiles, Su-27K fighters, and Kilo and Typhoon submarines.
Israel, another critical supplier, has provided laser-guided bombs and AWACs airplanes.
From Ukraine came a rusting Soviet-era carrier, recently refurbished and put to sea for
trials. But as much as China has paid in recent years to international arms dealers, efforts
regarding domestic production have been even more pronounced. 27 Her foreign-built
carrier, the Liaoning, is said to be followed by at least two domestically-produced vessels. 28
Already billions have been spent on the development of a naval air arm to accompany this
nascent fleet. 29 Three Type 052C guided missile destroyers have been put to sea, with
three more soon to follow. Another seven China-built, nuclear-powered attack and ballistic
missile subs are currently in the works. A further area of indigenous military development
is the stealth fighter program, with two separate models under development. 30 The star is
the Shenyang J-31, which bears uncanny resemblance to the rear section of the F-22 and
the forward of the F-35. 31 So too has the army deployed the world’s first ‘anti-ship ballistic
missile,’ a truck-mounted weapon that can strike rival fleets stationed in China’s littoral
waters hundreds of kilometres away. The PLA has even launched an aggressive push into
unmanned aerial vehicles, building variants that appear to be clones of the US Reaper and
Predator models.
25 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, (University of California
Press, 2004); Richard Fisher, China's Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach, (Stanford
Security Studies, 2010).
26 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at www.milexdata.sipri.org.
27 Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: the Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy, (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2008).
28 Richard Fisher, “China Has Plans for Five Carriers,” Aviation Week, (January 5, 2011).
29 The J-15 naval aircraft is roughly equivalent to the F-18, though with a shorter range and less sophisticated
sensors. The Ka-28 helicopter serves as submarine hunter. A Z-8 helicopter has been fitted with radar to
provide maritime airborne surveillance, albeit with a more limited range than an airplane like the USN’s E-2.
30 Richard Norton-Taylor, “Experts Surprised by Quick Development of Chinese Stealth Fighter,” The
Guardian, (January 11, 2011).
31 Although perhaps mere coincidence, it is worth nothing that the F-35 program was hacked by unknown
assailants and data stolen. John Reed, “China’s Newest Stealth Fighter Flies,” Foreign Policy, (October 31,
2012). The J-20 is the other stealth jet.
12The overarching lesson is that the quality of China’s military hardware is rapidly
improving. The ill-equipped PLA that rushed into Korea in 1950 and stumbled into
Vietnam in 1979 is no longer. Whereas China’s military industry could once only produce
cheap knockoffs of simple Russian equipment, the country today boasts gear with
sophistication and real military value. Problems remain at the very edge of the technology
frontier, such as with aircraft engines and naval propulsion systems, but the overall quality
has improved remarkably. "On some technology, they are now competitive…with
European arms exports and very competitive on price."32 Chinese equipment is known on
the international market for its no-frills reliability and cost effectiveness. Because of this,
China has become the world’s fourth largest exporter of military equipment.
The caveat to this is that despite the rapid improvement in the quality of China’s
military equipment, it still does not equal the very best of China’s rich rivals, whose models
remain between ten and twenty years ahead. The Liaoning, for example, lacks the catapult
necessary to launch large aircraft and travels with a tugboat in case the ship becomes
unable to return to port under its own power. The Type 052 warship carries only 50% as
many missiles as an American Arleigh Burke destroyer and its radar is likely far less
advanced. China’s two Type 093 submarines are capable of long range patrols but lack the
Very Low Frequency radios necessary to transmit orders from aircraft to submerged
submarines, as well as the higher frequency radios necessary for ship-to-submarine
communication. The result is a lack of tactical control over the underwater fleet. Another
indication that China has a ways to go is that it built two separate prototypes for the J-20
32Simon Wezeman, senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, cited in Tim
Hepher, “China Pushes Exports, Flags Ambitions at Arms Fair, Reuters, (November 16, 2012).
13stealth fighter, one with a Russia-made AL-31F engine because the other, the Chinese-
designed WS-10A, is simply too unreliable. The domestically-produced WZ-10 attack
helicopter faces similar engine problems. The aggressive push into cutting-edge military
equipment has thus not come without setback.
The struggle to improve troop quality has been similarly arduous, particularly in the
army, which is the least technologically-intensive, worst-educated, and most conservative
branch. A steep divide separates the ‘professionalist’ and ‘red’ camps, with the latter
emphasizing ideological purity and staunchly defending Mao’s outdated emphasis on
guerrilla tactics. Training and equipment are viewed as secondary matters in a true
‘peoples’ army.’ Instead, the red vision is of an entire nation rising up in arms, bound
together by a common patriotic consciousness. Opponents are to be overwhelmed by
superior numbers, hit-and-run tactics, and a greater moral commitment to the struggle.
The professionalists, on the other hand, advocate for a smaller, professional army, one
equipped with modern weaponry and sophisticated training. Having examined the
wreckage of America’s opponents in Saddam’s Iraq and Milosevic’s Kosovo, they fear
anything less is doomed to failure.
Although the latter school can be seen as ascendant, their mark has not yet been
fully felt. The PLA did, after all, respond quickly to the 7.9 magnitude earthquake in
Sichuan in 2008, and with an impressive degree of organization and eagerness to help. But
observers frequently noted the army’s primitive equipment and a marked lack of training.
China’s RMA enthusiasts themselves admit it will not be until the end of the decade before
the latest batch of advanced military platforms and their associated information networks
are fully rolled out. Even then the job will not be complete, as both the level of integration
and the overall technology itself will likely still be behind that of the West. 33 Few
anticipate, for example, that the deployment of the J-31 in the early 2020s will fully close
China’s fighter capability gap with the United States.
33 “The Dragon's New Teeth,” The Economist, (April 7, 2012).
14Balancing in Asia
The Chinese debacle in late-1970s Vietnam signalled to its neighbours that despite
the country’s vast bulk, China’s military prowess was surprisingly limited. Her divisions
were poorly led, improperly trained, and woefully under-equipped. The schism with
Moscow in the 1960s left the country cut off from the latest military technology. The anti-
materialism and anti-intellectualism espoused by the Cultural Revolution left the command
level bereft of modern and innovative military thought. China’s troops thus struggled
mightily to bring an exhausted, much-smaller country fighting a two-front war to heel,
leaving Beijing aghast and her rivals emboldened. A chastened Deng Xiaoping ensured
thereafter his country “kept its light under a bushel” and stayed away from foreign military
adventures. Military spending in the 1980s plummeted as the Party prioritized the
economy and other spending areas.
But growing power has brought serious reconsideration, both within the CCP’s
Zhongnanhai compound and amongst China’s neighbours. According to both RAND and the
Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, China will by 2020 be well on its way to
deterring foreign vessels from operating within the “first island chain”, the perimeter
running from the Aleutians in the north to Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo in the
south. 34 China’s neighbours know this and have begun to balance against her in ever-
greater fashion, relying primarily on the series of formal alliances signed between the
United States and its key Pacific partners following World War II. 35 The US for its part has
34Ibid.
35Formal defence pacts were signed with Australia and New Zealand (the “ANZUS” treaty), Japan, and the
Philippines. In 1953 and 1954 further agreements were formalized with South Korea and Taiwan. The
15announced plans to “rebalance” its naval forces, raising the number of fleet assets in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans from roughly 50% today to 60%. 36 In the summer of 2012
Secretary of State Clinton traveled through southeast Asia to sell this “southern pivot” and
found receptive audiences at each stop.
What makes the reinvigoration of this US-led security structure so remarkable is
that it has taken place despite the emergence of China as a vital economic confederate for
everyone involved. China is now the largest trading partner of Taiwan, Japan, South Korea,
and Australia, yet each perceives China as its greatest long-term threat. As China’s military
has become bolder and more powerful, these countries have in turn been looking to the
United States for closer security ties. According to Satu Limaye, Washington director for
Hawaii’s East-West Centre: “the demand for American security has never been higher.” 37
There are several reasons for this. The first is that the United States remains the
continent’s strongest naval power and offers an unrivalled nuclear umbrella. For this
reason, “If you are buying security, [America] is the place to shop.” 38 The second is that
relations between China’s neighbours themselves are fraught with enduring suspicion.
Japanese-South Korea relations in particular remain frosty, requiring America to serve as a
much-needed mediator. Third and most important is that China’s growing bellicosity has
done little to calm the assumption that its intentions are less than purely benign. In June
2012, for example, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) announced it would conduct
formal alliance with Taiwan lapsed when the US recognized China in 1979, though an informal arrangement
remains.
36 Jane Perlez, “Leon Panetta Outlines New Weaponry for Pacific,” New York Times, (June 1, 2012).
37 Cited from Banyan, “Where Asia Left It's Heart,” The Economist, (September 24, 2011).
38 Ibid.
16“combat-ready patrols” of contested waters in the South China Sea. This followed an
escalating series of naval clashes between Chinese, US, and Japanese forces off its eastern
coast as well. So too did China’s failure to condemn North Korea after the sinking of the
ROKS Cheonan rattle the once-improving relations between Beijing and Seoul. In Taiwan,
booming trade with the mainland has not undone the fact that a thousand PLA missiles
remain trained upon the breakaway island. China, in other words, has poorly hidden its
recent efforts to reassert itself in East Asia. 39 That its neighbours would begin to balance
together more tightly is a natural response.
Chinese Security
But what about the other direction? If growing Chinese power is driving its
neighbours into a stronger alliance, should this not cause alarm in Beijing as well?
Germany’s rise in the late 19th and early 20th centuries caused great consternation in Paris,
London, and St. Petersburg, and did much to establish the ‘Triple Entente’ that German
military commanders found so unacceptably dangerous. In a classic example of the arms
racing dynamic, improved German military power made its neighbours more vulnerable to
attack. These countries constructed new armies and alliances in response, almost certainly
out of an entirely defensive motivation. Yet this newfound Entente power fed German
suspicions that its rivals sought to thwart the young country’s rapid rise. Germany then
built more of its own armies in return, endangering her neighbours once again. On and on
the circle went, until fear trumped reason and the Great War broke out.
The Chinese case faces two significant departures from this historical precedent.
First is that Germany shared a land border with its chief military rivals. As was shown in
1914, 1918, and 1945, invading French and Russian armies can simply walk onto German
soil. The China case is different in part because of the ‘stopping power of water’. 40 As both
Hitler and Napoleon would lament, projecting power is exponentially more difficult when
every bullet and bandage must first be transported by ship or barge. Fortunately for China,
it is separated from its two chief strategic rivals, Japan and the United States, by large
bodies of water. Even with the PLA’s qualitative inferiority, landing an army upon Chinese
shores would pose a significant military challenge. China’s plentiful littoral missile
defences alone would badly dent any invading fleet. The likelihood of such an event is
therefore unlikely to keep serious PLA commanders up late at night.
The second distinction is that China is armed with nuclear weapons and a relatively
robust second-strike capability. Conservative estimates put the number of Chinese
warheads at several hundred. Better understood are the platforms used to deliver them.
Under the command of the Second Artillery Corps (SAC), China’s nuclear forces field
roughly 66 land-based ICBMs and 24 submarine-launched SLBMs. To this total the SAC
adds 116 intermediate range ballistic missiles, capable of distances in excess of 1,750 km,
as well as 204 short range ballistic missiles (for ranges between 300 and 600 km) and 54
land attack cruise missiles, capable of striking targets 3,000 km away. The land based
missiles are protected by 5,000 km worth of military tunnels. Dubbed by state media as the
39 Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, (New York:
W.W. Norton, 2012).
40 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
17“Underground Great Wall,” their task is to keep China’s strategic missile squadron safe for a
counterstrike in the event of a nuclear attack. 41 At sea, the PLAN is developing the Type
094 and Type 096 ballistic missile submarines, the latter likely to carry up to 24 JL-2
ballistic missiles each. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) operates an aging H-6 bomber fleet,
composed of 120 aircraft modelled on the Tupolev Tu-16 Badger. These are capable of
dropping both conventional and nuclear payloads, but are due to be replaced by the
rumoured H-8 and H-9 strategic bombers. The lesson is that not only does China have a
significant number of nuclear weapons, it also boasts an impressive array of means to
deliver them. Both serve as an important deterrent to any would-be invader.
A Well-Armed Equilibrium
So how secure is China under the present international order? The short answer is
very. China is no longer an unwieldy collection of obsolete weaponry and ill-trained
cadres, incapable of standing up to a modern military opponent. Today it boasts a rapidly
improving arsenal and an ambitious young officer corps, much of which has taken the RMA
lessons of the past 20 years to heart. Under generals such as Fang Fenghui, head of the
PLA, the Chinese military is slowly becoming more professional. The dead weight is
being jettisoned and old equipment replaced with advanced platforms that operate in
conjunction with a network of sophisticated sensors and communications devices. Already
some analysts imagine Chinese military power denying the United States access to parts of
the Pacific in less than a decade. 42 As is, most areas within the first island chain have
become far too dangerous for anyone seeking to land on Chinese shores without welcome.
It is important, however, to recognized that this power is far from unbridled.
Chinese military technology remains at the leading edge a generation behind the US and its
allies. Though rapidly improving, China’s soldiers and sailors are nowhere near as potent
as those of the West, many of whom have honed their skills for over a decade at war.
Reinforcing this message of deterrence against China is the tightening trans-Pacific alliance.
The stronger China grows, the more resolute this balancing becomes. The paradoxical
result is that while China deploys an ever larger and more impressive military, the
country’s relative power remains basically the same. The addition of several more Liaoning
class aircraft carriers, for example, do Beijing no favours if they encourage South Korea and
Japan’s new flattops to sail to each others’ aid in the time of crisis.
41“China Builds Underground ‘Great Wall’ Against Nuke Attack,” The Chosn Iibo, (December 14, 2009).
42Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “China, Japan and the World's Agadir Crisis (1911),” The Telegraph, (September
19, 2012).
18China’s Central Military Committee is well aware of this. Hyper-nationalists like the
state-run Global Times may threaten that if “countries don’t want to change their ways with
China, they will need to prepare for the sounds of cannons,” 43 but few at the very heights of
China’s defence and foreign ministry establishment contend such logic is sound. Even
within the military itself—as neurotic and jingoistic an organization as can be found in
China—the belief that pre-emptive military force would bring tangible benefit is noticeably
mute. No one thinks that a quick march will deliver Beijing into foreign hands. By any
rational estimation, then, the great powers of East Asia are locked into an equilibrium of
military stability.
But what of the potential for irrational conclusions? What if reason is abandoned at
the hands of emotion? In the next section we examine this prospect.
43 Economist, “Dragon’s”.
19Revanchism
“Diaoyu Islands Belong to China
We refuse to sell Japanese good in Silk Street Market”
Protest banner, Beijing (September 2012)
All nations harbour grudges. The ebb and flow of history invariably crowns some
winners and others losers. Whether by fair means or foul, armies are beaten, treaties are
broken, princes become paupers, and hegemony proves fleeting. The animus generated by
such traumas does not usually dissipate in their immediate aftermath, but is seared into
collective memory. This scarring process rarely consists of a straightforward recollection
of facts. Stories of kith and kin, after all, are seldom told with an unsympathetic eye.
Tragically, the consequence of such myths is that they make national grievances difficult to
address.
Before and After the Fall
Nothing builds national pride more than success. This is important, because of all the
great powers today, none carry a more distinguished pedigree than China. The Chinese
state traces itself all the way back to 221 BC, when Qin Shihuang united four contending
principalities into a single polity. His empire stretched for an area equal to roughly one-
third modern China, encompassing the northern half of the country out to the western leg
of the Great Wall. At its peak, the imperial court at Xi’an presided over a population of
roughly 60 million. Even more impressive is that the bureaucracy the Qin established
remained in place under various guises until the 20th century. Twice the country was
seized by foreigners: the Mongols, who established the Yuan Dynasty in the 13th century;
and the Manchus, who founded the Qing Dynasty in 1644. Yet each time the conquerors
and their horse-borne armies were quickly assimilated into the peoples they overran.
Change was cyclical, not linear; new dynasties looked to recreate the old order rather than
build an entirely new one.
And what an incredible order it was. Centuries passed, but China retained its role as
‘middle kingdom’. Its armies were larger, cities more populous, and industry more
developed than any of its neighbours. Tribute flowed into the country, along with
obeisance from all but the most obstinate tribes along the inner steppes. As Maddison has
shown, China boast title as the world’s largest economy for virtually its entire existence.
When the Mediterranean was laid low by the war, pestilence, and political upheaval that
followed the fall of Rome, even per capita wealth stood for a time ahead. 44 The technology
gap was even more profound, with China well in front of the West until the 16th century. 45
Meanwhile, Qing military success roughly doubled the country’s territorial size between
44 Angus Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, (Paris: OECD Development Center, 2007).
As late as 1820, China’s population dwarfed that of Western Europe 381 million to 170 million. Economic
metrics were no different, with China’s GDP outmatching all of Western Europe’s $229 billion to $160 billion.
(All figures in million 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars). Angus Maddison, Contours of the World
Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
45 See, for example, Joseph Needham, Science in Traditional China: A Comparative Perspective, (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
201680 and 1820. 46 These conquests, including Mongolia in 1696-97, Taiwan in 1683, Tibet
in 1720, and a huge area of central Asia in 1756-57, did much to secure China’s inner Asian
frontiers. An additional “outer perimeter of docile tributaries,” including Burma, Nepal,
Siam, Annam, Korea, and the Ryukus, provided an extra layer of security. 47 For century
after century, China stood as a bastion of relative calm in a world of upheaval and national
extinction.
The durability of China’s success manifest itself in supreme national self-confidence.
The Qing, for example, set up an office for managing modern-day Mongolia, Xinjiang, and
Tibet. They named it the Lifan Yuan or ‘barbarian management department’. Similarly
illustrative is the missive issued by Emperor Qian Long to an emissary of George III in
1793:
“The Celestial Court has pacified and possessed the territory within the four seas….
The virtue and prestige of the Celestial Dynasty having spread far and wide, the
kings of the myriad nations come by land and sea with all sorts of precious things.
Consequently there is nothing we lack…. We have never set much store on strange
or ingenious objects. Nor do we need any more of your country’s manufactures.”
This may have been true for a good deal of time. But the decades following Qian’s death
demonstrated that the European world had already passed China by. Whereas China once
employed iron-tipped plows when the West still struggled with wooden-tipped versions,
now it was China that lagged behind, sticking with iron even as Europe moved on to steel.
By the 1830s, China was facing a rising population, stagnating economic productivity, a
decrepit transportation system, and a steady drain of silver to British heroin merchants. To
make matters worse, in 1850 a madman named Hong Xiuquan instigated the Taiping
Rebellion, a civil war that lasted fourteen years and plunged the country into chaos and
starvation. When combined with two humiliating military defeats at the hands of Great
Britain, confidence in the central government evaporated. A proud nation fell prostrate
before a series of ruthless foreign predators, the last of whom did not leave until America’s
crushing victory across the East China Sea forced the evacuation of the Japanese army in
1945.
Festering Slights
China has, for the most part, regained its lost territory. Japan’s forces are long gone.
Hong Kong has been returned from Great Britain. Outside a few small border spats, largely
the legacy of a failed Indian gamble in 1962, the ‘great game’ played along China’s western
interior has been settled. Geographically, China today reflects almost completely the
borders maintained by the Qing. Tibet, provided de facto independence under British
auspices in 1912, was retaken by the PLA in 1951. Manchuria, first captured by Russia,
who then lost it to Japan, has been similarly given back. The diplomatic legations in Beijing,
whose imposition in the mid-1800s was so hated by the Boxers and their followers, exist
today at the mercy of China’s rulers. Firms now seek permission to enter Chinese markets
rather than rely on the Royal Navy to batter a way through. The middle kingdom, in other
46 Maddison 2007, p43. In 1820, China’s national territory stood at twelve million square kilometres.
47 Ibid.
21words, boasts a degree of political independence not seen since the time of Qian Long’s
declaration.
But forgiveness for past transgressions has not been forthcoming. The wound to
China’s national pride inflicted by these colonial adventures lingers on. The least
worrisome of these grievances is the enduring sense that, because the contemporary
international system was built during a period of steep Chinese disadvantage, the country’s
voice is improperly represented on the international stage. 48 This is especially true when it
comes to America and its perceived global leadership. The assumption is the United States
has no desire to share this role and actively seeks to thwart the ambitions of others. This
sense of unease is helped by neither the constant USN patrols through what China
considers its backyard 49 nor the presence of 30,000 American troops on the Korean
peninsula. By contrast, Chinese observers have long pointed to the “superhegemonist”
ambitions of the United States, 50 arguing that the deployment of American military forces
to the region serve the interests of Washington alone. Episodes of Sino-American tension
during the Tiananmen massacre, the 1995-6 Taiwan Straits crisis, and following the 1999
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade have all fed the perception that the United
States is “not just arrogant,” but actively seeking “to prevent China from prospering and
gaining its rightful place at the top of the world system.” 51 Meanwhile, the close association
of the United Nations and Europe with this US-led structure ensures a similar degree of
suspicion towards them as well.
48 Song Qiang et al., Unhappy China: the Great Time, Grand Vision and Our Challenges, (2009); Zhang Zangzang
et al., China Can Say No: Political and Emotional Choices in the Post Cold-War Era, (1996).
49 The US views South China Sea as international waters and calls for the freedom of navigation.
50 David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialism: China Perceives America, 1971-1990, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1991), p252-53.
51 Gries 2003, p142-43. See also Kagan 2009, p32-33.
22Two factors mitigate this grievance. The first is that the basic architecture of the post-
World War II order was built to accommodate the war’s victors. Though largely the result
of forces beyond its control, China had the good fortune to emerge on the winning side.
Incorporating Beijing into this arrangement during the 1970s’ Sino-US rapprochement took
a degree of diplomatic dexterity—the United States had to quietly dump Taiwan and hand
over its UN security council seat to the communists—but the structures themselves were
ready-made to include Chinese participation. More recently, the United States has signalled
a similar willingness to bring China into the G-20 and other such fora, with the only proviso
that China brings along its chequebook.
For its part, China has eagerly embraced such opportunities, acceding to the WTO in
2001—a membership sought “voluntarily and with great tenacity.” 52 China similarly
responded to the Great Recession of 2008-09 not with a cascade of beggar-thy-neighbour
policies but rather a $585 billion stimulus package and an eagerness to cooperate. China
was a keen participant at the 2008 Washington and 2009 London G20 summits. In the
latter it committed to help Japan and the European Union in raising $250 billion additional
bail-out funds for the IMF. 53 China has been equally collaborative on the topic of climate
change. It is, for example, a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen and Ambo
declarations. More broadly, the Yearbook of International Organizations reports that the
number of Chinese memberships in intergovernmental organizations has grown steadily
over the last decade, returning to the country’s pre-Tiananmen peak. More importantly,
52 Jeffrey Sachs and Wing Thye Woo, “China's Economic Growth After WTO Membership,” Journal of Chinese
Economic and Business Studies 1, no. 1 (2003): 1–31.
53 Rich Miller and Simon Kennedy, “G-20 Shapes New World Order with Lesser Role for U.S. Markets,”
Bloomberg, (April 2, 2009).
23whereas China’s international participation in the early reform period was notably
“passive”, today the country is a much more active participant and displays a generally high
standard of regime compliance. 54
*Source: Reprinted from Hachigian et al 2009, p11-12.
A grievance of greater intensity are the territorial disputes that dot the country’s
borders. The descent from untrammelled empire to regional also-ran bred serious
disagreements over where China’s borders should lie. The resolution of these overlapping
claims, however, has generally gone smoothly. Through concerted effort and a willingness
to deal, China resolved fourteen of its sixteen post-1949 land-border disputes. 55 In each
case China came to the table offering compromise, and all but Bhutan and India found the
terms acceptable. Further negotiations in the 1980s with Britain and Portugal similarly
secured the peaceful return of Hong Kong and Macau, the last Asian holdouts of Europe’s
bygone imperial era. This leaves the territorial dispute with India as the only serious
remaining land border issue, and even this is more properly subsumed under the greater
Indo-Pakistan contest over Kashmir. The border squabble has certainly proved little
hindrance to the rapidly growing Sino-Indian trade, valued at more than $60 billion in 2010
and projected to increase further. Like those with the global north, China’s relations with
India harbour considerable mistrust and worry, but there exists no martial intent.
The South and East China Seas
At sea the story has not been nearly so pleasing. There China confronts both less
geopolitical necessity for concluding these quarrels and insufficient naval power to force a
54 Nina Hachigian, Winny Chen, and Christopher Beddor, China's New Engagement in the International System,
(Center for American Progress, November 2009).
55 These were Burma, Nepal, North Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, three with Russia, Laos, Vietnam,
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. M Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Co-operation,”
International Security, (Fall 2005).
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